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VIII
Come the Revolution: A Legal Perspective on
Air Operations in Iraq since 2003
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.*
Introduction
Has the early part of the twenty-first century shown the most dramatic revolu-tion in the role of law in armed conflict in history?1 Evidence suggests that it
has. Today, for example, allegations about civilian casualties often dominate our dis-
cussions about strategy in irregular war, itself a phenomenon that, according to the
National Defense Strategy, will preoccupy our military services for years to come.2
Indeed, as will be discussed below in more detail, adherence to law in armed
conflict fact and perception is increasingly a central, if not defining, concern of field
commanders, as well as military and civilian leaders at every level. It is appropriate
then to pause for a moment and discuss our experiences in Iraq since 2003, and to
see what lessons we should—and should not—draw from them. Of course, there
are many aspects of the role of law—and lawyers—but this paper will confine itself
to some of the issues that arose from the use of airpower.
Combat Operations
Perhaps the most dramatic change during the major combat operations (MCO)
phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)3 that impacted adherence to the law of
* Major General, United States Air Force. The views and opinions expressed are those of the
author alone and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any of its components.
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armed conflict (LOAC) was the vast increase in precision-guided munitions
(PGMs)4 employed by coalition air forces (even though their employment is not, per
se, required by LOAC).5 During 1991’s Operation Desert Storm, just 8 percent of the
air-delivered bombs and missiles were PGMs.6 By contrast, during the MCO phase
of OIF that percentage rose to nearly 68 percent.7 Today, virtually all are PGMs.
PGMs provided unique opportunities to minimize the risk to civilians and their
property, a central aim of LOAC. Consider this 2003 report from Time magazine
about the early phases of OIF:
Judging from the look of the [OIF] battlefields today, the bombing was largely surgical.
In the open market in Mahmudiyah, five tanks were hit from the air while they were
parked in alleyways so narrow that their gun turrets could not be turned. The
storefront windows a few feet away were blown out, but otherwise the surrounding
buildings are intact.8
Besides PGMs, something of a more strategic mindset was at play during OIF. In
short, simply because a particular target might lawfully be struck, that did not mean
that it would be attacked. In fact, “hundreds of bridges, rail lines, power stations
and other facilities” as well as “communication nodes and a few leadership sites”
were spared.9
The targeting restraint demonstrated not only a better understanding of legal
and moral imperatives, but also the practicalities of twenty-first-century opera-
tions. For example, one aviator observed that “[a] lot of care was put into selecting
only those valid military targets that were absolutely essential to assist in taking
Baghdad and securing the country” because planners knew that “anything destroyed
from the air, like Iraqi roads, bridges, and power-generating stations, would have
to be rebuilt during the post-war period.”10
It appears that this pragmatic mindset, along with the revolutionary new muni-
tions technologies, helped OIF air operations adhere to LOAC. Even Human Rights
Watch (HRW), in its December 2003 report entitled Off Target: The Conduct of the
War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq, gave a largely favorable assessment to the air
campaign.11 Although highly critical of leadership targeting and the use of cluster
munitions, HRW nevertheless acknowledged that coalition forces “took significant
steps to protect civilians during the air war.”12 In particular, HRW concluded that
“air strikes on preplanned fixed targets apparently caused few civilian casualties,
and . . . air forces generally avoided civilian infrastructure.”13
Despite an initially slower pace of kinetic air operations after 2003,14 the Air
Force continued to develop technologies to enhance the ability to apply force with
great discretion. While the MCO phase did feature a “far greater use of overhead
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imagery” than in previous conflicts,15 the truly revolutionary improvement in in-
telligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)16 capabilities did not come to
fruition until unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) became widely available.17
The growth in the number of drones—many of which are now armed—has
been mind-boggling. From a mere 167 in the military’s inventory in 2001, there are
now over 5,500.18 These assets have been especially important during the insur-
gency or “irregular war” phase of operations in Iraq because they can provide what
some are calling an “unblinking eye” on enemy activities without risk to friendly
troops.19 Consider this 2008 report from journalist Mark Benjamin:
The Air Force recently watched one man in Iraq for more than five weeks, carefully
recording his habits—where he lives, works and worships, and whom he meets. . . . The
military may decide to have such a man arrested, or to do nothing at all. Or, at any
moment they could decide to blow him to smithereens.20
The new technologies are transforming the way twenty-first-century conflicts
are fought. According to retired Army General Barry McCaffrey the marriage of
unmanned ISR platforms like the MQ-1 Predator,21 the MQ-9 Reaper22 and the
RQ-4 Global Hawk,23 with PGMs such as the various Joint Direct Attack Munitions24
constitutes a “100 year war-fighting leap-ahead” that has, McCaffrey insists, “fun-
damentally changed the nature of warfare.”25
The synergistic effect of persistent ISR with precision strike in irregular warfare
was exemplified by the 2006 airstrike in Iraq that killed the notorious Al Qaeda
leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In a recent CBS 60 Minutes’ interview, General
Norton Schwartz, the Air Force Chief of Staff, explained:
Here’s the way it goes. You had 600 hours of Predator time over a lengthy period . . .
following Zarqawi. And then you had maybe six minutes of F-16 time to finish the
target. It reflects again the power of the unmanned systems to produce the kind of
intelligence that leads you to a guy like Zarqawi, who was very good at maintaining his
anonymity.26
When ISR capabilities are available, the task of the legal advisor is greatly
facilitated because the deliberateness they allow also permits steps to be taken to
limit civilian casualties, especially with respect to preplanned targets. The senior Air
Force judge advocate currently forward deployed notes the revolutionary impact
of ISR on LOAC compliance relative to previous conflicts:
It’s airborne ISR that gives us the ability to actually apply [LOAC] principles (with
almost mathematical precision) that were originally just concepts. In WWII, for
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example, we could merely speculate about where a bomb or an artillery round would
land. Frequently, we were guessing about the target at which we were aiming. Now, we
most often have photos of the target and often have FMV [full motion video] of the
target area before, during and after the strike, so we can know with near certainty what
collateral casualties or damage we are likely to cause.27
Without question, the key to such “near certainty” is, again, the availability of
both accurate ISR and the time to digest the data it produces. The proverbial “fog”28
of war still applies, and command decisions may have to be made on the basis of
“incomplete” data, as was especially the case early in OIF.29 Nevertheless, airpower
has rather unexpectedly proved vital to the counterinsurgency success the United
States has enjoyed in Iraq in recent years.
Ironically, even the relatively recently published counterinsurgency doctrine
does not fully reflect the full potential of contemporary airpower. In fact, the
Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual,30 unveiled in December of
2006, sought to discourage the use of airstrikes,31 largely because, it appears, the
drafters relied heavily upon case studies from the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s, long be-
fore today’s ISR and precision-strike capabilities became available. Regardless, it
is extremely noteworthy that, despite the doctrine, real success in suppressing in-
surgent activity in Iraq did not come until 2007, a year that saw airstrikes sky-
rocket by fivefold.32
New technologies have served to significantly reduce—albeit not eliminate—
the risk to innocent civilians. To the surprise of some observers, airstrikes have not
been a leading cause of civilian casualties in Iraq.33 Specifically, although critical of
air attacks in civilian areas, a just-published New England Journal of Medicine study
of civilian casualties in Iraq from 2003 to 2008 found that aerial bombs and missiles
accounted for only 5 percent of the civilian casualties (as opposed to, for example,
20 percent attributed to small arms fire).34
That said, it is a mistake to conceive of the LOAC revolution strictly in terms of
new technologies; it also involves fresh approaches to organizing, training and em-
ploying judge advocates (JAGs).
The Legal Architecture
Although Air Force JAGs had been forward deployed for operations virtually since
the service’s inception,35 they were not typically found36 in what we would now
call air and space operations centers (AOCs).37 However, a 1988 Joint Chiefs of
Staff directive required legal review of operations’ planning, and that provided a
basis to regularize the JAG presence in AOCs beginning with 1989’s Operation
Just Cause in Panama.38 That presence continued through various operations,
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including Operation Desert Storm as well as the enforcement of the no-fly zone
over Iraq during the 1990s.39
The air-oriented operations in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Free-
dom in 2001–2 had “heavy” JAG involvement.40 Thus, prior to the start of MCO in
Iraq in 2003, it was expected that JAGs would serve in the AOC. Preparation for
that service was facilitated by the participation of several Judge Advocate General’s
Corps members in Internal Look, an exercise that took place in late November and
early December of 2002. According to one participant, the “rigorous exercise en-
abled JAs to gain experience . . . while [also] learning the computer software appli-
cations that would be utilized during the conflicts.”41
Mastering the computer systems used in AOCs is an essential skill for JAG advi-
sors. Because many of these systems are unique to that environment, all Air Force
JAGs who serve in AOCs must attend the Air Force Air Operations Center Initial
Qualification Training Offensive Course conducted at Hurlburt Field, Florida.42
This five-week course is standard for all AOC personnel, regardless of career field,
and covers doctrine, AOC organization and processes, air battle plan development,
air tasking order43 production and execution, operational assessment and more.44
While the course is much concerned with developing a common understanding
of the concepts applicable to the command and control of the air component, it
also provides “hands on” instruction on the Theater Battle Management Core Sys-
tems and the Automated Deep Operations Coordination System. Those systems,
along with the Information Work Space communications process, as well as the
“mIRC” system (an Internet Relay Chat network), are critical tools for anyone work-
ing in the AOC, to include legal personnel. Beyond mastering these technologies,
JAGs must also learn the applicable collateral damage estimation methodology.45
Writing in a 2006 article for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Colin Kahl, now Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East,46 describes this process as one that
“uses computer software and human analysis to estimate possible civilian casual-
ties for every target studied.”47 In essence, Dr. Kahl says, it requires commanders
and their legal advisors to ask themselves five questions which he phrases this way:
Can they positively identify the person or the site according to the current ROE [rules
of engagement48]? Is there a protected civilian facility or significant environmental
concern within the range of the weapon to be used? Can damage to that concern be
avoided by attacking the target with a different weapon or a different method? If not,
how many people are likely to be injured or killed in the attack? Must a higher
commander be called for permission?49
Although advanced computer and communications systems help answer such
questions and indeed have revolutionized how JAG personnel do their jobs, there
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is no substitute for physical presence in the AOC. At its height, there were twelve
JAG personnel assigned to the AOC during OIF.50 Some of these focused on Air
Force support issues, but most were used to directly advise commanders and oth-
ers on the conduct of operations. What was particularly revolutionary about JAG
utilization was how they were distributed.
The complexity of preplanned air operations is such that legal advice must be
integrated long before the plan is ready for final approval. Accordingly, JAGs had a
constant presence in the AOC’s Strategy Division, as well as its Plans Division.51
This is a lesson, incidentally, that the Air Force learned prior to OIF. General Ron-
ald E. Keys, who had served as the commander of NATO’s AIRSOUTH, Stabiliza-
tion Forces Air Component and Kosovo Forces Air Component, insisted in a 2002
interview that “[t]he important thing is that the legal advisor has got to be inte-
grated into the operational team. He can’t be an afterthought. He has to be there
when the plan is being made.”52
This early involvement by JAGs in operational planning is now de rigueur in
AOCs. In fact, in July of 2008 the New York Times noted that “Air Force lawyers vet
all the airstrikes approved by the operational air commanders.”53 In this way they
can provide input at the very early stages of an air tasking order’s development so
that today there rarely are legal issues associated with preplanned targets. As a re-
sult, the Air Force has, according to Human Rights Watch’s Marc Garlasco, “all but
eliminated civilian casualties in Afghanistan” in strikes that are a product of the de-
liberate planning process. This is true even though more stringent ROE for Af-
ghanistan require “a significantly lower risk of civilian casualties than was
acceptable in Iraq.”54
Of course not all airstrikes are a product of preplanning. Dynamic targeting,55
such as airstrikes in response to urgent requests for close air support56 coming from
friendly troops in contact with enemy forces, presents the most difficult challenge.
To the extent such targets can be vetted by JAGs, the responsibility falls to the JAG
assigned to the Combat Operations Division. During the critical, early phases of
OIF this JAG “sat at a console in the elevated platform in the center of the [AOC]
floor” next to the chief of combat operations.57 Among other things the proximity
to senior leaders allowed “face to face” conversations that significantly enhanced
the assigned JAG’s situational awareness.58
Still, challenges existed then—and persist today—with respect to dynamic tar-
geting. The same New York Times article that noted the contribution of JAGs and
the near absence of civilian casualties in preplanned strikes also observed that
most civilian casualties occur during strikes conducted at the request of ground
commanders.59 Likewise, a September 2008 report by Human Rights Watch about
operations in Afghanistan concluded that civilian casualties “rarely occur during
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planned airstrikes on suspected Taliban targets” but rather “almost always oc-
curred during the fluid, rapid-response strikes, often carried out in support of
ground troops.”60
Providing timely legal advice in these difficult situations re-emphasizes the im-
portance of physical presence and proximity. In the effort to address the civilian ca-
sualty dilemma journalist Anna Mulrine points out that “the JAG officer [in the
AOC] sits through the shift next to the Afghanistan duty officer, where they can
consult easily.”61 Keeping a JAG close to decisionmakers is but one example of the
several lessons to be learned from air operations in Iraq since 2003.
Lessons Learned
Though this article does not purport to be an exhaustive listing of “lessons
learned,” such an endeavor would surely begin with the importance of the
institutionalization of JAGs as essential players in the command and control pro-
cess of combat air operations.62 Dr. Peter Singer comments in his new book, Wired
for War, that given “advancing technology and thorny legal questions, many advise
that [commanders] had better get used to the growing presence of lawyers inside
military operations.”63 Because of the importance of legal legitimacy of military
operations not just to the US electorate, but also to the publics of America’s
warfighting allies, Dr. Rebecca Grant bluntly insists that in “modern coalition war-
fare, attention to the law of war is a strategic necessity.”64
Importantly, Dr. Singer also notes that the “other side knows the [legal] limits,
and will do everything possible to take advantage.”65 We live in an age where adver-
saries increasingly seek to employ the fact or perception of illegalities, to especially
include allegations of excessive civilian casualties, as a means of offsetting not just
US airpower, but America’s overall military prowess. Law professor and veteran
William Eckhardt points out that that today “our enemies carefully attack our mili-
tary plans as illegal and immoral and our execution of those plans as contrary to the
‘law of war’ making law, in essence, a ‘center of gravity’ in modern conflicts.”66
This phenomenon—which may be called lawfare67—is more than simply ex-
ploiting incidents of collateral damage; it extends to actually orchestrating events
designed to put civilians at unnecessary risk. As Anthony Cordesman puts it in his
2007 report about airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan, “both the Taliban and Iraqi
insurgents often located hostile forces in civilian areas and compounds, and
steadily increased their efforts to use them as human shields.”68
This deliberate use of human shields has hardly diminished, especially in Af-
ghanistan. At a June 2009 news conference, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told
reporters that “we know the Taliban target innocent civilian Afghans, use them as
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shields, mingle with them and lie abut their actions.”69 He recognizes that “a
principal strategic tactic of the Taliban . . . is either provoking or exploiting civil-
ian casualties.”70
Addressing such challenges starts with what might be called “legal preparation
of the battlespace” (LPB).71 There are many facets to LPB. Quite obviously, the im-
mediate access72 to expert legal advice can help avoid LOAC incidents that an ad-
versary can exploit. However, advising commanders in operations that involve the
complex weaponry and the sophisticated ISR capabilities available today requires
specialized knowledge. JAG advisors must be thoroughly familiar not only with the
applicable law, but also with a myriad of technical specifics related to weapons,
platforms, strategies and other aspects of the military art.
It is an axiom of the practice of law that a lawyer must understand the facts of the
client’s business in order to apply the law properly to issues that arise from it. This
is particularly important with respect to the complexities of air warfare. For exam-
ple, seemingly slight adjustments in munitions’ delivery can make real differences
in terms of limiting collateral damage.
Specifically, “[d]elaying an explosion by just a few milliseconds can mean that a
bomb gets buried deeper into the ground before exploding.”73 Thus, a JAG must
understand how fusing and other technicalities of weaponeering can affect blast
patterns and, in turn, the lives of innocent civilians. Wherever possible, JAGs must
try to help to offer alternatives that fulfill the commanders’ intent, while also limit-
ing collateral damage. To reiterate, competence to do so requires an intimate un-
derstanding of the client’s “business,” so to speak, of war making.
Several other dimensions of LPB exist. It necessarily includes ensuring that
forces are fully trained in the requirements of LOAC, as well as the additional
limitations imposed by policy and incorporated in the ROE. Beyond the basic
LOAC training all members of the US military receive, the Air Force also has devel-
oped an advanced LOAC presentation which has been integrated into the Joint Force
Air Component Commander Course mandated for all senior officers destined to
command AOCs.74 This training addresses difficult topics such as targeting dual-
use facilities, human shields, the use of cluster munitions and much more.
Today, for example, commanders must be concerned about the investigation of
complaints about airstrikes. While this is currently being effectively accomplished
via ad hoc teams assembled for specific cases,75 it may be better to establish a stand-
ing investigatory capability explicitly designed for such purposes. The teams
should be interdisciplinary, to include JAGs, intelligence officers, operations ex-
perts, public affairs professionals and other specialties that would enable a timely
explanation of incidents that carry the potential for enemy exploitation.
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Interestingly, the Israelis seem very conscious of the possibility that lawfare
might be waged against them. Accordingly, combat units in the 2008–9 Gaza oper-
ation were accompanied by operational verification teams equipped with cameras,
tape recorders and other equipment to document the facts as operations were con-
ducted.76 Apparently this was done in anticipation of receiving various allegations
of LOAC violations.77 Clearly, this approach to preserving evidence is worthy of
further study and possible emulation.
LPB also should involve preparing the media78 and the public generally with a
proper understanding of LOAC.79 In this way misunderstandings and unrealistic
expectations can be avoided. For example, LOAC recognizes that the tragedy of ci-
vilian deaths inevitably occurs in war. Thus, LOAC does not prohibit attacks even
when such losses can be anticipated;80 rather, attacks are forbidden where the civil-
ian casualties would be “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military ad-
vantage anticipated.”81
Unfortunately, today the enemy is trying to exploit LOAC to deter attacks not
just by intermingling with civilians, but also—as already indicated—by affirma-
tively forcing civilians to remain in targeted buildings.82 If the wrong perception
about LOAC requirements in such circumstances becomes accepted wisdom, that
is, that the mere presence of any civilians is interpreted as creating a de facto safe
haven for adversaries,83 it could result in commanders’ hands being needlessly tied
with respect to the air weapon.84 In essence, the enemy would be “rewarded” for a
grotesque LOAC violation of deliberately putting innocent civilians at risk.
Finally, it is worth re-emphasizing that the fundamental responsibility of JAGs
to provide candid advice85—even when it may be unwelcome—is especially im-
portant in combat operations. Lieutenant General Michael Short, who com-
manded the air component during the successful Kosovo campaign, counsels
operational lawyers to be thoroughly familiar with the mission, its challenges and
the rules that will govern it. He further observes that if necessary
do not be afraid to tell [the commander] what he really does not want to hear—that he
has put together this exquisite plan, but his targets indeed are not valid ones or his
targets may in fact violate the law of armed conflict. . . . It will take enormous courage to
do that in particular circumstances because you’re always going to be junior to your
boss. . . . But you have got to be able to do that.86
While military lawyers can get support from their JAG superiors,87 they still
must demonstrate valor in war.88 True, JAGs are not often called upon to demon-
strate the physical courage so central to close combat situations; however, they
more often are required to demonstrate moral courage. It is a rather melancholy
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observation of some experts that the former type of courage is common in armed
forces while the latter—moral courage—can often be in short supply.89 Yet if there
is a lesson for the military lawyer that has emerged in the years since 9/11, it is the
vital importance of moral courage.
It is clear that the fact or perception of illegalities, whether from the mistreat-
ment of detainees captured in ground operations90 or from the infliction of exces-
sive civilian casualties in an airstrike, are among the greatest threats to mission
success in twenty-first-century operations.91 Ensuring adherence to the rule of law
must involve many more actors than JAGs, but JAGs must be ready to provide
leadership.
As this article seeks to demonstrate, preparing to exercise such leadership is a
complex and demanding task that requires real dedication and discipline. But pre-
pare we must; the stakes are just too great. Listen to these words attributed to
Winston Churchill:
To every person, there comes in their lifetime that special moment when they are
tapped on the shoulder and offered that chance to do a very special thing, unique to
them and fitted to their talents. What a tragedy if that moment finds them unprepared
and unqualified for the work that would be their finest hour.92
Fortunately, it is conferences like the one that brought us together in Newport that
help us—and those who look to us for leadership—to get ready for that inevitable
Churchillian moment in this era of revolutionary change in the roles of law and
lawyers in armed conflict.
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